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Abstract 
The legal nature of international law is uncertain, despite being the foundation of the 
international community. Its non-universality questions the cohesion and efficacy of the 
international community. The international community operates as an exclusive club, 
coalescing around certain shared values, like liberal democracy and free market economy. 
Sub-Saharan Africa is usually excluded from being an active part of the international 
community due to differing values; a shared understanding of community which conflicts 
with the shared values of the core of the international community. Furthermore, their post-
colonial nature deters African states from choosing their own path or adopting the norms of 
the ‘international community.’ A paradigmatic shift in research into sub-Saharan Africa and 
the international community is necessary to ensure a truly effective international community 
and wider observance of international law. 
 
Keywords: international community, African legal philosophy, state failure, sub-Saharan 
Africa, international law 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The international community is not well defined, a problem that can be seen as rendering it 
ineffective. It is also not international – the requirements for entry do not reflect the diversity 
of its members, further enhancing this ineffectiveness. The impact on sub-Saharan Africa is 
that the international community, and the international law that arises from it, fosters internal 
divisions by holding sub-Saharan African states to requirements that the very nature of these 
states prevents them from achieving. African internal ideology can cure these deficiencies by 
emphasising the communal nature of community. African philosophy focuses on the cyclic 
nature of the relationship between the community and individual; an adoption of a similar 
approach by the international community would refocus the effects of the international 
community on the well-being and needs of individuals and populations instead of blindly 
shoring up ineffectual states. To achieve these aims, international legal theory research has to 
engage in a paradigm shift. Research needs to be deconstructive, interdisciplinary and critical 
of accepted legal imperatives. If these problems are not addressed, the international 
community will continue to be ineffective: international law may be flouted with impunity as 
the shared values that supposedly underpin it are not universally accepted; ratification of 
treaties is not backed by adherence. The implications of these factors on the international 
sphere could be widespread and are borne out by increasing academic disillusion with the 
enforcement of international law norms by the international community.1 
The normative status of international law is often disputed; it is sometimes said to be 
more related to politics or international relations. One reason for this is the lack of a defined 
international sovereign. The international community is often called upon to play the role of 
sovereign. The possibility of the international community performing the role of a unitary 
                                                 
1 Eric A. Posner, The Twilight of Human Rights Law (Oxford University Press, 2014); Stephen Hopgood, The 
Endtimes of Human Rights (Cornell University Press, 2013). 
2 | P a g e  
 
cohered, supreme actor becomes increasingly dim the in light of various situations around the 
world such as the crises in the Middle East and Ukraine, poverty in the third world, human 
rights violations, the spread of disease and the imperfect operation of democracy. Various 
attempts have been made to define or evaluate the existence of the international community; 
these attempts exhibit the deep schisms that exist not only in global society, but also in 
academic theory.2 They also reflect the less than pervading nature of international law. The 
nature of international law and the composition of the international community are 
intrinsically linked. International law determines the values of the international community; 
the values of the international community determine the content of international law and 
provide for entry into the community; the cohesion of the international community 
determines the normativity of international law. Any disconnect in the diffusion of function 
between international law and the international community reduces the efficiency of both.  
The ‘international community’ as an accepted (though nebulous) paradigm is 
exclusive,3 it normally excludes sub-Saharan Africa, while insisting on and prescribing the 
internal order of its states. Further, the ever-changing nature of the international system, 
fluctuations in the prominence of certain states and the shift of prevailing issues on the world 
stage continue to affect the practical determination of the core composition of the 
international community.4 The character of the international community is affected by the 
rise to prominence of non-mainstream states such as China, Russia and Brazil, whose internal 
ideologies are not necessarily indicative of liberal democracy or a free market economy.5 The 
tensions on the character of the international community are exacerbated by the fact that non-
‘Western’ ideology does not monolithically coalesce, having repercussions across the 
international sphere.6  
The elusive nature of the international community can be traced to the interconnected 
nature of international law and international politics. In domestic law, the strict observance of 
the law does not allow for pragmatic flexibility. Nevertheless in the international sphere, 
political operations are eased by reduced normativity in practice.  
There is debate in international law, international politics and international relations 
surrounding the possible existence of a unitary actor on the international scene known as the 
“international community” or an emergence of an international collective order.7 It is almost 
                                                 
2 Kofi A. Annan, “Problems without Passports”, 132 Foreign Policy (2002) 30-31; Rajan Menon, “Pious Words, 
Puny Deeds: The ‘International Community’ and Mass Atrocities”, 23 Ethics & International Affairs (2009) 
235-246; Barry Buzan and A. N. A. Gonzalez‐Pelaez, “‘International Community’ after Iraq”, 81 International 
Affairs (2005) 31-52; Frank Schimmelfennig, “Goffman Meets IR: Dramaturgical Action in International 
Community”, 12 International Review of Sociology  (2002) 417-437; J. Bryan Hehir, “The Limits Of 
Loyalty." 132 Foreign Policy (2002) 38-39; How World Opinion Kidnapped By West's 'Int'l Community' 
Rhetoric (People's Daily Online) 11:03, September 01, 2012; Tony Blair, “Doctrine of the International 
Community." Speech to the Economic Club of Chicago 22 (1999). 22 April 1999; David C Ellis, “On the 
Possibility of ‘International Community’”, 11 International Studies Review (2009) 1-26; Andrew Gowers, “The 
Power of Two”, 132 Foreign Policy (2002) 32-33; Andreas Paulus, “The Influence of the United States on the 
Concept of the ‘International Community’”, in M. Byers and G. Nolte (eds.), United States Hegemony and the 
Foundations of International Law (2003) 57 – 90; Frank Ching, “Who Defines the 'International Community?'” 
The Diplomat September 12, 2012 
3 Hannes Peltonen, “In or Out? International Community Membership: Beliefs, Behaviour, Contextuality and 
Principles”, 27 Cambridge Review of International Affairs (2014) 489; Bruno Simma and Andreas L. Paulus, 
“The ‘International Community’: Facing the Challenge of Globalization”, 9 European Journal of International 
Law (1998) 268; Paulus (n. 2) 58. 
4 Ellis (n. 2) 23. 
5 William W. Burke-White, “Power Shifts in International Law: Structural Realignment and Substantive 
Pluralism”, U of Penn Law School, Public Law Research Paper No. 14-2 (2014) 7; Paulus (n. 2) 59 
6 Burke-White (n. 5) 7. 
7 Menon (n. 2) 235 – 246; Samantha Besson “Ubi Ius, Ibi Civitas: A Republican Account of the International 
Community.” In S. Besson and Marti (eds.), Legal Republicanism: National and International Perspectives. 
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logical to say that the use of the word “community” precludes it from being an actual unitary 
actor but a community of actors (state and non-state). Menon constructs this as a conception 
of a virtual ‘international community, unified by a conception of the common good and with 
the means to prevent egregious violations of its core principles.’8 The international 
community as a narrative is more generally used either as an appeal for collective action or an 
appeal to collective morals,9 notwithstanding the fact that the basis for such belief in 
collective unanimity is not often well-founded. As a call for action, the international 
community is widely perceived as referring to the West,10 thus, the collective morals usually 
espoused on behalf of the international community are often coloured by precepts which have 
been claimed to be Western precepts, such as liberal democracy, human rights and free 
market economy.11 Actions in the name of the international community are therefore 
frequently engaged in by US, Europe and their allies.12 In response to this perception, China 
has derived its own definition of the international community.13 The effects of these tensions 
are far-reaching, and the solutions require innovative and inclusive approaches to research. 
Some answers can be found in sub-Saharan African moral and legal philosophy. In this 
article, sub-Saharan Africa and Africa is used interchangeably, and sub-Saharan Africa is 
meant except where the whole of Africa is referred to. This article will examine the processes 
which define the international community; the place of African states within this community; 
African political ideology’s conflict with international legal theory; a different process for 
defining the international community that does not institutionally exclude Africa; and the 
consequences of African exclusion. 
 
 
2. What is the International Community?  
 
Section 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) is one of the strongest 
and most accepted indications of the legal recognition of the international community as a 
unitary actor. It suggests that obligations erga omnes can be owed to it, thus establishing the 
peremptory nature of certain international norms.14 The ideological view of the international 
community as the conscience of mankind or a value system,15 is not mutually exclusive of the 
practical legal consequences of inferring the existence of an, albeit fictional, international 
community. Values frequently alluded to by states, usually through the architecture of the 
United Nations (UN), include freedom, equality, tolerance and dignity.  
                                                                                                                                                        
(Oxford University Press; 2009) 205 – 238; Adeno Addis “Imagining the International Community: The 
Constitutive Dimension of Universal Jurisdiction”, 31 Human Rights Quarterly (2009)129–162; Philip Allott 
“The Emerging Universal Legal System” In J. Nijman and A. Nollkaemper (eds.) New Perspectives on the 
Divide Between National and International Law (Oxford University Press; 2007) 81-83. 
8 Menon (n.2) 237. 
9 Buzan and A. N. A. Gonzalez‐Pelaez (n. 2) 32 -33. 
10 Ibid 33; Dino Kritsiotis, “Imagining the International Community”, 13 European Journal of International 
Law (2002) 991. 
11 How World Opinion Kidnapped By West's 'Int'l Community' Rhetoric (People's Daily Online) 11:03, 
September 01, 2012. 
12 Peltonen (n. 3) 475 
13 Frank Ching (n. 2) 
14 Article 53 reads in part “For the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general 
international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a 
norm from which no derogation is permitted...” 
15 Simma and Paulus (n. 3) 268; Edward Kwakwa, “The International Community, International Law, and the 
United States: Three In One, Two against One, or One and the Same?” in M. Byers and G. Nolte (eds.), United 
States Hegemony and the Foundations of International Law (2003) 33 – 34. 
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Due to its ideological origins, the international community is not only fictitious but 
intangible. Therefore Menon observes that the phrase ‘international community’ has been 
considered ‘merely a cliché or a soothing sentiment invoked reflexively by leaders who can 
offer no meaningful response in the face of mass atrocities’;16 and Ogata asserts that the 
international community is invisible and impotent.17 The international community is a 
community whose existence and recognition is dependent on the actions of its constituent 
actors. The use of the term ultimately obscures, and allows states to avoid responsibility.18 In 
the evolution of the international community, the continuing action of actors in the 
international arena would ultimately determine the emergence of a recognisable international 
community would be. The problem with the use of the phrase “international community” is 
that it invites obfuscation;19 presently the ‘international community’ has no apparent 
recognisable legal personality. Attempts to define of the international community rely on 
certain theories of international legal and political thought. 
 
2.1.The Community of States 
Phrases like the ‘international community of states’, suggest that it is generally restricted to 
statehood, as states are regarded as the basic unit of the international system.20 The emphasis 
on states in defining the international community grants states dominant status over people. 
The impact of the primacy and sovereign equality of states can be dampened by the concept 
of self-determination and equal human rights.21 Nevertheless, the peculiar nature of statehood 
in sub-Saharan Africa contributes to excluding them from the international community. 
Furthermore, increasingly, we see economic, military and social power transcending 
boundaries, political influence is peculiarly still confined by fictional boundaries.22 Nowhere 
are they more fictional than in sub-Saharan Africa. The concept of ‘pays frontier’ defined as 
‘geographical areas that lie across the boundary separating two or several neighbouring 
states, and are inhabited by people bonded by socio-cultural and economic links’ is of special 
significance to sub-Saharan Africa.23 
 
2.2. The UN as the International Community 
The UN is often seen as the physical embodiment of the international community.24 
Traditionally the authority to use force or approve the use of force to protect international 
peace and security belongs to the UN. Therefore, the UN has been identified as either the 
international community, the primary agency of the international community, or the only 
institution through which the international community can legitimately act.25 Nevertheless, 
where a humanitarian situation is sufficiently grave, either as regards suffering populations or 
the entity wanting to intervene, the need to seek the approval of the UN diminishes.26 For 
                                                 
16 Menon (n. 2) 235. 
17 Sadako Ogata “Guilty Parties”, 132 Foreign Policy (2002) 40. 
18 Gowers (n. 2) 32-33 
19 Thomas G. Weiss, “Researching Humanitarian Intervention: Some Lessons”, 38 Journal of Peace Research 
(2001) 423. 
20 Paulus (n. 2) 62; Georges Abi-Saab, “Whither the International Community?” 9 European Journal of 
International Law (1998) 249. 
21 Abi-Saab (n. 20) 261. 
22 Jeffrey Herbst, “Responding to State Failure in Africa”, 21 International Security (1996) 140. 
23 Report of the Meeting of Experts on the Border Programme of the African Union Bamako, Mali, 8 – 9 March, 
2007 paragraphs 16-18; Memorandum on “Cross-Border” Concept or Local Integration”  ECOWAS 2005, 
paragraph 6. These areas are also known as “cross-border areas” or “Borderlands” or “border regions.” 
24 Noam Chomsky, “The Crimes of INTCOM”, 132 Foreign Policy (2002) 34. 
25 Ellis (n. 2) 14. 
26 George R Lucas Jr, “The Role of the 'International Community' in Just War Tradition - Confronting the 
Challenges of Humanitarian Intervention and Preemptive War”, 2 Journal of Military Ethics (2003) 127. 
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example, the UN Security Council gave retrospective approval of the Economic Community 
of West African States (ECOWAS) interventions in Sierra Leone and Liberia.27 Where the 
situation is grave enough and the political will not globally distributed, the UN’s relevance is 
uncertain. 
 
2.3.The People of the World as the International Community 
Hehir’s perception of the international community removes the groupings of state that 
differentiate human existence and chooses to perceive the world without the lines on the 
ground – the sum of humanity as a cohesive whole.28 Hehir’s view is interlinked with the 
belief that the international community has a conscience,29 as states and institutions only have 
a conscience in so far as their human components have a conscience. The role of civil society 
can be seen as an extension of this conscience – global civil society is thus perceived as an 
integral part of the international community. Thus, an international organisation such as the 
UN will sometimes directly address non-state actors.30 However, this conceptualisation 
disregards the importance of states and the necessity of non-state institutions with some 
normative authority. Nevertheless, this conception of the international community is a 
progressively post-Westphalian idea in tune with the human security narrative. Human 
security is regarded as a post-Cold War concept.31 It involves a paradigm shift of the ‘focus 
of security to the ability of individuals to live, rather than states to exist.’32 It is a mechanism 
‘to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human 
fulfilment’.33 
 
2.4.US and Europe 
Another view of the international community is reflected in Gowers’ assertion that when the 
‘international community’ is called upon to act, the entity to whom this plea is made is 
usually the United States and Europe.34 In his opinion this is because these are the powers 
capable of determining the course of world events, the powers whose common values have 
decided the direction of the international community.35 Thus the US, for example cannot 
disobey the international community, because it cannot disobey itself.36 Likewise, Chomsky’s 
definition of the international community recognises the US and its allies as this elusive 
entity;37 while Hehir accepts the international community as the entity that is able to ‘inform 
policy choices.’38 Thus in the view of some authors the international community is 
paradoxically not international39 and does not represent the majority of the world’s 
                                                 
27 Simon Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian Intervention and International Law (Oxford 
University Press; 2001) 122, 135- 137, 156; Liberia - UN SC resolutions S/RES/788 on 19/11/92; S/RES/866 on 
22/9/93; S/RES/950 on 21/10/94; Sierra Leone - UN SC resolutions S/RES/1132 on 8/10/97; S/RES/1181 on 
13/7/98; S/RES/1162 on 17/4/99. 
28 Hehir (n. 2) 38. 
29 Annan (n. 2) 31. 
30 Simma and Paulus (n. 3) 275. 
31 Taylor Owen, “The Critique That Doesn’t Bite: A Response to David Chandler’s ‘Human Security: The Dog 
That Didn’t Bark,’” 39 Security Dialogue (2008) 113. 
32 Taylor Owen, “The Uncertain Future of Human Security in the UN” in M. Goucha and J. Crowley (eds.), 
Rethinking Human Security (Blackwell Press, Oxford; 2008) 447. 
33 Cited in Owen (n. 31) 118. 
34 Gowers (n. 2) 32-33. 
35 Ibid., 33. 
36 Chomsky (n. 24) 34; Kwakwa (n. 15) 56. 
37 Chomsky (n. 24) 34. 
38 Hehir (n. 2) 38. 
39 Arjun Appadurai, “Broken Promises”, 132 Foreign Policy (2002) 43; Gowers (n. 2) 32-33; Chomsky (n. 24) 
34. 
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population.40 In other words, they perceive it to be limited to the proportion of the states of 
the world that exhibit signs of political and economic dominance. This characterisation 
ignores that fact that each region has local hegemons who would be more likely to determine 
the course of their own ‘world’ events.  
 
2.5.Liberal Democracies with Free Market Economies 
A more conceptual approach is employed in Buchan’s summation of the international 
community as an extension of the identity of its liberal member states, thus the community, to 
maintain its communal aspect, is of necessity exclusive.41 According to Buchan, for states to 
be considered part of international community, they have to exhibit traits of liberal 
democracy, even if their internal political culture is not one of liberal democracy. Essentially, 
to join the club you have to wear the tie, the other items of clothing are not as important. This 
articulation of the international community is reflected in US foreign policy, that is, 
democracy and free market economy, includes states and international organisations in the 
international community – allying them to the US – accords them legitimacy and protects 
them from multilateral intervention from the US.42  
Despite this insistence on democracy, the international system is not entirely 
democratic, this is exemplified in the power and position granted the five permanent 
members of the Security Council.43 Allot attributes the format of the international community 
to the fact that liberal democracy evolved from constitutional monarchy and still retains some 
monarchical precepts – governments are sovereign, absolute monarchs with absolute 
sovereignty over their own territories.44 
Nevertheless, liberal states still need a point of convergence. The need to find a 
universal judge or standard setter, and this causes the international community to crystallise 
around an identifiable entity.45 Generically the UN forms the nucleus around which state and 
non-state actors exhibit traits of community in the organism known as the international 
community. In cases where the UN is unable, unwilling or unsuited to act as the nucleus or 
pivot, the organism changes character and any of the preceding formulations take precedence. 
For example, when a regional organisation such as ECOWAS exhibits the characteristics of 
the international community within its region without recourse to the UN except for 
retrospective approval, binary fission occurs, splitting the international community into 
different organisms with different self-interests around regional hegemonies.46 Thus the 
international community can be described as nothing more than a fluid super-social order 
which coheres in different ways to protect interests that cannot be protected nationally.47 
 
 
3. The ‘International Community’, International Law and Global Action 
 
The term ‘international community’ is thus used to imply cohesion in a purposive way, 
therefore the act of repetition implies and virtually ensures reality. Article 53 of the VCLT 
                                                 
40 Jeane Kirkpatrick, “The Shackles of Consensus”, 132 Foreign Policy (2002) 37; Appadurai (n. 39) 43. 
41 Russell Buchan, “A Clash of Normativities: International Society and International Community”, 10 
International Community Law Review (2008) 5. 
42 Paulus (n. 2) 87; Kwakwa (n. 15) 39. 
43 Kirkpatrick (n. 40) 36. 
44 Philip Allott, “The True Function of Law in the International Community” 5 Indiana Journal of Global Legal 
Studies (1998) 407. 
45 Ibid., 411. 
46 Simma and Paulus (n. 3) 272; Kwakwa (n. 15) 44. 
47 Santiago Villalpando, “The Legal Dimension Of The International Community: How Community Interests 
Are Protected In International Law”, 21 European Journal of International Law (2010) 391, 396, 397. 
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indicates that states ambitiously assume that it is principles of international law that bind the 
state and non-state constituents of the international community together into a unitary actor.48 
This ignores the innate reflex of exclusivity and alterity that characterise human existence 
and history and is constantly exhibited in international relations. This conceptualisation of the 
relation of the international community to international law relies on the presumption of a 
purposeful shared morality.49 Koskenniemi warns of the use of moralisation to fuel and fuse 
international politics and law;50 he states that it moves the discussion from the public realm to 
that of private conscience. Furthermore, a confusion between morals, law and politics reflect 
a persistent conflation of ideas with similar ideologies, such as the conflation of the meaning 
of international community in the ‘Just War’ tradition and international law, implying a lack 
of distinction between the normative and the descriptive.51 
An assumption of shared values is predicated on the false assumption that morals are 
irretrievably shared by peoples and states,52 and values can never coincide, though agreement 
may occur where cross cultural value judgments need to be made.53 Political will which 
arises from national self-interest is more relevant to international community action than 
altruism, situations in other states only become relevant when acting would be advantageous, 
the mere fact of foreignness may suffice to make the situation irrelevant.54 The need to 
generate political will among the members of the international community can be traced 
primarily to the fact that any proposed action has no material advantage for them. Weighed 
against stretched resources, competing national interests and the intricacies of international 
politics, the will for positive action diminishes. Effective action appeals to individual self-
interest and not collective morality. The use of ‘international community’ usually arises from 
an underlying aim, be it a call for action or an appeal to morality; to avoid confusion, the use 
of the phrase should be curtailed or accompanied by making the purpose of its use overt.55 
According to Ellis and Schimmelfennig, the existence of an international community 
is dependent on a specific intersection between common values and interaction in the unified 
pursuit of a joint purpose.56 What Ellis and Schimmelfennig suggest is that international 
community is achieved by high interaction density and high levels of common ethos/interest. 
Where there is high interaction but no common interest what results is a desire and need to 
obey international law; a situation called interdependence.57 The existence of the UN Charter 
and the attendant prospect for international constitutionality can be cited as an example of the 
organised interdependence required by Westphalian states to survive in the international 
system. Tony Blair in his 1999 speech to the Economic Club, suggested that national aims 
could only be achieved by international cooperation,58 thus states depend on each other to 
achieve aims that are increasingly international.  
                                                 
48 Simma and Paulus (n. 3) 267 
49 Hehir (n. 2) 38.  
50 Martti Koskenniemi “‘The Lady Doth Protest Too Much’ Kosovo, and the Turn to Ethics in International 
Law”, 65 The Modern Law Review (2000) 161. 
51 Lucas Jr (n. 26) 128, 129, 142 – 143. 
52 Buzan and A. N. A. Gonzalez‐Pelaez (n. 2) 38; Ikechi Mgbeoji, “The Civilised Self and the Barbaric Other: 
Imperial Delusions of Order and the Challenges of Human Security”, 27 Third World Quarterly (2006) 861. 
53 Allott (n. 44) 412. 
54 Tony Blair, “Doctrine of the International Community: 10 Years Later”, 4 Yale Journal of International 
Affairs (2009) 13; Burke-White (n. 5) 34, 38; Paulus (n. 2) 63, 64; Berit Bliesemann de Guevara and Florian P. 
Kühn, “‘The International Community Needs to Act’: Loose Use and Empty Signalling of a Hackneyed 
Concept, 18 International Peacekeeping (2011)136; Allott (n. 44) 405. 
55 Buzan and A. N. A. Gonzalez‐Pelaez (n. 2) 35 
56 Ellis (n. 2) 8 
57 Schimmelfennig (n. 2) 427 
58 Blair (n. 2) 
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Ellis and Schimmelfenning, state that where there is common interest and low 
interaction density this is a situation where ‘collective outcomes’ are shaped by 
internationally accepted law called ‘civilization.’59 Furthermore, where there is no common 
interest and low interaction density states coexist and do not have to be or want to be bound 
by any international norms.60  
Interdependence is one step below the institution of a functioning international 
community. Neither step can be achieved without effective and observed international law. 
The existence of the international community is thus intrinsically bound to the operation of 
international law and goes beyond mere interaction or interdependence but is predicated on 
these factors.61 Part of the close relationship causes and is caused by the similarity of 
international law to international relations/politics.  
The operation of international relations occurs due to common interests and values in 
the international system.62 The perceived incidental actualisation of the international 
community should protect states’ interests;63 at the most sophisticated level of interaction and 
communality the interests of states as well as individuals may be protected.64 This protection 
relies on commonly accepted international law. This can be evinced from the concept of 
universalism and the belief in some fundamental essence of humanity that remains immutable 
across cultures and geographical spaces.65 Universal jurisdiction over crimes which are 
ostensibly committed against individuals – or a group of individuals – presumes that there is 
an international community which is also a victim. If there was no international community 
there should strictly not be universal jurisdiction for these types of crimes. Genocide and 
terrorism increasingly, for example, have been said to be attacks on the diversity of the 
international community.66 States are increasingly vulnerable to international crimes, it is the 
nature of those crimes that requires international cooperation to prevent and prosecute; they 
therefore fall into the sphere of international interest.67 Addis creates a verbal picture of this 
global interconnectedness: ‘the world has become like a drum – if hit on one end, the whole 
thing will vibrate.’68 
International law, therefore, presumes the common values of the international 
community;69 these common values themselves are tentative evidence of the existence of a 
community with shared interests and common goals in the international sphere.70 Allott 
maintains that the nature and function of law in the international community mimics the 
nature and function of law within state borders.71 He goes on further to state that law ‘is a 
systematic actualizing of a given society's values.’72 Allot therefore portrays international law 
as a reflection of and actualization of the international society’s/community’s values.73 
International law can be said to be a system of collective state agreement on what the shared 
                                                 
59Schimmelfennig (n. 2) 427 
60 Ibid. 
61 Peltonen (n. 3) 487. 
62 Schimmelfennig (n. 2) 426; Ellis (n. 2) 7; Kritsiotis (n. 10) 967. 
63 Simma and Paulus (n. 3) 268. 
64 Simma and Paulus (n. 3) 271; Addis (n. 7) 144. 
65 Addis (n. 7) 144. 
66 Addis (n. 7) 146; Michael Ignatieff, “The Danger of a World without Enemies: Lemkin's Word”, 26 The New 
Republic (2001) 27-28. 
67 Addis (n. 7) 150, 151; Annan (n. 2) 31. 
68 Addis (n. 7) 151. 
69 Simma and Paulus (n. 3) 223. 
70 Addis (n. 7) 144; Annan (n. 2) 30; Simma and Paulus (n. 3) 268. 
71 Allott (n. 44) 395. 
72 Ibid. 398. 
73 Simma and Paulus (n. 3) 267. 
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values of the international system should be or are.74 Shared values on the international scene 
therefore result in international society and international law to regulate that society and its 
interests, the conglomeration and increasing sophistication of the above circumstances result 
in the international community.75 This accords a responsibility to law, and especially 
international law, which it is currently not equipped to handle.76  
 
 
4. Sub-Saharan African States in the International Community 
 
As a result of the shared history which links the states of Western Europe and states such as 
the US, their values have combined to ensure a block of economically influence-driven 
consensus which has been exhibited and maintained through the UN.77 The effect of this 
monolithic accord has pervaded international law and international politics. 
What this means for sub-Saharan Africa with its imperfect state structures is that the 
conception or formulation of international community excludes Africa, creates tension as 
sub-Saharan Africa governments’ allegiances to the populace and international community 
differs dramatically. The notion of ‘African solutions for African problems’ is often used by 
African statesmen to bridge this divide, allowing them to discharge their obligations to the 
international community by purporting to utilise local ideology. There is, however, no 
conceptual bridge, in reality, between the requirements of community on the international 
stage, and fulfilling the aspirations of the people in sub-Saharan Africa. Furthermore, 
statesmen have often used cultural relativism as an excuse for human rights violations and 
abuse of process or power. Ideally, democracy should remove the ability of leaders using the 
peoples’ culture to oppress this people; this has not always happened in practice. 
Realistically, states in Africa have more to lose from instability in the region, therefore 
African governments seek to contain domestic and sub-regional emergencies in 
unconventional ways. In this sense the urgency to ensure regional stability will lessen in 
proportion to the ripple effect of insecurity as it moves out of the region to the outer edges of 
the world. Where there is a disconnect between populace and government, this situation will 
leave populations isolated. Therefore, more account should be taken of the internal working 
of sub-Saharan Africa states, African jurisprudence and philosophy to attain a truly 
international, democratic and just ‘international community’. 
 
4.1.Sub-Saharan Africa, Liberal Democracy and Internal Political Ideology 
Buchan suggests that what defines members of the international community is the practice of 
liberal democracy and free market economy because sovereignty is linked to non-
interference; where the democratic elements are unobserved by a state, the international is no 
longer beholden to recognise its sovereignty.78 This is because the international community is 
perceived as a more morally responsible entity.79 It has been suggested that the faulty 
recognition accorded to sub-Saharan Africa states should be withdrawn.80 Democracy can be 
considered as an international human right enshrined in Article 25 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) or a means of implementing the human 
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rights codified in international human rights law. Democracy is encouraged because ‘good 
governance is a crucial element for peace and development, while autocracy has been shown 
to fuel conflict, and human rights violations in a number of cases.’81 Autocracy retards 
development, however, the economic rise of China questions the conventional accepted link 
between liberal democracy, free market economy and development. The requirement for 
democracy presupposes that democracy is the only form of ‘good governance’. Furthermore, 
democracy is seen as a means of ensuring human rights protection or the shared values of the 
international community such as freedom, equality, tolerance and dignity are reflected in 
national life. 
‘Democracy’ has been used as a tool for opposition politicians to deceptively garner 
the support of the international community.82 Democracy in sub-Saharan Africa is 
purposively appropriated by the political elite and used to empower politicians and not 
populations.83 This is facilitated by the nature of the international system. The results of 
implementing democracy through elections in sub-Saharan Africa have in many cases been 
counterproductive, causing conflict, human rights violations and further departure from 
democratic principles.84 Finally, an entitlement to democracy within a state exhibiting 
institutional and operational failure is largely a redundant right.85 The implementation of 
democracy in sub-Saharan Africa is hampered by the lack of modification of Western style 
democracy when applied to sub-Saharan Africa and an emphasis on civil and political rights 
at the expense of economic, social and cultural (ESC) rights.86 Democracy and market-
economy do not reflect the needs, aspirations and characteristics of the populations of sub-
Saharan Africa, this is to the advantage of corrupt African leaders.87 Further, democratic 
requirements must take into consideration the almost non-existent state in Africa. 
Ultimately the understanding of personhood in sub-Saharan African philosophy is 
very dissimilar to Western personhood. The primacy of the community over the individual 
imbalances the concept of society and the post-colonial sub-Saharan Africa state was not 
designed and has not been adapted to liberal democracy or market economy. 
 
4.2. African Traditional Philosophy and Ideology and the Nature of Statehood 
 
4.2.1. African Philosophy 
African philosophy is typified by ‘ancient wisdom’ and legal philosophy usually in the form 
of oral tradition passed from generation to generation,88 this ensures that certain values 
become and remain part of the people. Theories such as ubuntu, ujamaa, umunna bu ike, 
illustrate African ideological belief in the predominance of the community and the family, the 
fact that all people within the community should work for the advancement of the 
community, promote collectivism, and harmony and frown on individualism, focus on 
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interdependence, caring, humanity and show disregard for state boundaries.89 The concept of 
‘pays frontier’, mentioned above, ensures not only that these ideological beliefs limit the 
operation of Westphalianism, but that they pervade most of the continent in a non-state based 
manner. 
African philosophy as articulated by pan-African writers gives communitarian values 
predominance.90 Menkiti illustrates how this differs from Western society, by pointing out 
that African community is a fused singular entity and a society is not constituted by 
individuals, but the society or community constitutes persons.91 It is an almost collective 
African belief that a person attains personhood not by being born, but as a gradual process; 
personhood involves a continuous state of becoming.92 A human being is not necessarily a 
person; there is usually no separate word for human being.93 Therefore, the understanding of 
the words, ‘person’, ‘community’, and ‘society’, like so many concepts, lose something in 
translation.94 By combining and dissecting various communities using colonial boundaries, 
allegiances to the community were not transferred to the state, but protected from the state, 
inciting negative peace. Negative peace is marked by increased tension and suspicion. There 
is a high level of systematic frustration and social, political and ethnic cleavages. 95 
The articulation of these ideologies arise out of a realisation of the impact of 
‘Europeanisation’ on the internal nature of African cultural philosophy and political 
cultures.96 This realisation and articulation occurs despite the irreversible nature of such 
impact. Being conscious of a distinct African ideology of constitutive community does not 
necessarily set it completely apart from other accepted ideologies; this is ideologically 
impossible in the case of African ideology that recognises the affinity and holisticality of 
human community. Furthermore, articulation of a singular or similar African ideology should 
be accepted with caution. Often the spatial entity of sub-Saharan Africa is conflated with the 
whole of Africa. Africa is a varied collection of disparate states and ethno-linguistic groups 
whose customs, cultures and philosophies are equally disparate. Articulation of contiguous 
philosophy is less based on empirical evidence and more on intellectual cogitation of pre-
colonial activists and contemporary diasporic thinkers whose ideas may not be universally or 
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internally accepted. Internal developments in sub-Saharan Africa illustrate this, but they also 
illustrate the incongruity of imposed ideology. 
Nevertheless, to deny agency to African communal constitutive theories based on 
their uncertainty and incongruence with accepted international law questions the ends of the 
law. The philosophy should be clarified and modified not completely discounted. To 
paraphrase, ‘is law made for man, or man made for the law?’ If Africans accept their 
communities as paramount and the means by which their achieve identity and legitimacy, 
who are we to say that constituted law cannot recognise this? 
Indigenous philosophy reflects the idea that equality can be impacted upon by cultural 
differences.97 Thus human rights theory is differently understood within African philosophy. 
The argument for the universality of human rights relies heavily on the belief that the family 
of humanity share common values such as dignity, respect, liberty, justice, and equality.98 
However, the different ways in which these common values play out resulted in the 
bifurcation of the human rights covenants into two separate instruments in 1966.99 The 
influence of sub-Saharan Africa was demonstrably weak in 1966, at the time many of the 
African states were about six years old, with a non-residual sovereignty.100 Had the influence 
of African states been stronger, there may have been a wider dispersion of influences on the 
human rights covenants.  
According the Locke, ‘The power that every individual gave the society when he 
entered into it can never revert to the individuals again.’101 However, the community level of 
sub-Saharan Africa ideology has no recognition of Lockean theory. In sub-Saharan Africa the 
‘society’ or community which the individual regards as his society, to which he has given 
power is not the exact one recognized by the international community. The state recognized 
by the international community has failed in its Weberian duty but has more external 
legitimacy than internal. The legal philosophy it is asked to protect differs from the ideology 
of the individuals it has been called upon to protect. The community to whom the individual 
has innate allegiance – the community that personifies the individual – has no legal 
legitimacy to be protected or to protect. 
 
4.2.2. Sub-Saharan Africa’s Post-Colonial States 
Sub-Saharan Africa Post-Colonial states have peculiar and similar characteristics due to their 
origin and structure. They exist as postscripts at the end of colonialism, where transitions 
were marked by incomplete adoption of the Westphalian nature which decolonisation merely 
alluded to.102 This is compounded by internal and inflexible adherence to precolonial theories 
of primordial concepts of community.103 Democracy as characterised by elections and 
practised by post-colonial African states involve a system of reward before election rather 
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than entry into government via election to carry out favoured policies.104 The desire and 
impetus to operate liberal democracies are not evident in the populace, as sub-Saharan Africa 
has more patrimonial systems that seek messianic figures rather than accountable human 
representatives.105 Therefore, post- independence, government and politics were dominated 
by a central figure at the head of a dominant party – for example, Houphouet-Boigny in Cote 
d’Ivoire, Nkrumah in Ghana, Diori in Niger, and Toure in Guinea.106 The tendency towards 
saviour-like characters was exacerbated by the repression and domination inherent in 
colonisation.107 Rather than the new sub-Saharan Africa leader ‘delivering’ their people, they 
effectively stepped into the role vacated by the colonisers with more visible effects. In 
response to the un-messianic nature of the politicians in government, there has been an 
increase in warlord politics predicated on an increase in societal ills and public dissatisfaction 
and alienation from government.108 
The postcolonial state mirrors the colonial state in that its executives were intent on 
controlling the resources of the state. However, while colonial plunder was on the behalf of 
the mother state, in the case of post-colonial sub-Saharan Africa states the plunder is for 
personal benefit and carried out locally.109 Furthermore, a cohesive state did not exist before 
independence and state wealth could not be attributed to the people. The lack of a cohesive 
state before and after colonisation has contributed to the current state ‘failure’, though a non-
existent state can hardly be said to have failed. The colonies were ruled in a militaristic 
fashion of subjugation, a style which continued at independence.110 The paucity of the post-
colonial state can be traced to the sudden removal of the financial crutch which the colonial 
state provided.  
International law and the personage of the international community operate on the 
presumption that all states have the same organic character, that is to say, there is a 
presumption that within all states the relationship between the state and the individual is 
similar. However this disregards the primacy accorded to African community. Further, this 
presumption attributes characteristics to the post-colonial state which is does not have and 
was not historically designed to attain. 
Max Weber defined a state as an entity that successfully claims a 
‘monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force.’111 Locke posited that society was created 
for the protection of the natural law of right to life, liberty, and property.112 Consequently, the 
state has the use of force for the purpose of, among other things, the protection of human 
rights, pursuing the welfare of its citizens and the maintenance of public order. Therefore, 
when intuitively Weberian states fail their Lockean function, the sovereignty of those states 
becomes conditional and such states are termed as failed. Kofi Annan described the state in 
sub-Saharan Africa (the classic failed state) as having ‘insufficient accountability of leaders, 
lack of transparency in regimes, inadequate checks and balances, non-adherence to the rule of 
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law, absence of peaceful means to change or replace leadership, or lack of respect for human 
rights,…’113 
Colonialism is a result of a departure from natural law and a fruit of nineteenth 
century positivism which was characterised by a quest for formal sovereignty and ‘civilised’ 
states.114 This resulted in autocratic regimes which practice an extreme form of positivism 
due to the departure of morality and altruism from international law and increasing national 
self-interest. Insertion of altruistic ends into self-interested autocracy results in the current 
tension between individual, innate community, state and international community. 
Sub-Saharan Africa inherited boundaries and structures that do not take cognisance of 
any internal ideologies or groupings, they therefore achieved sovereignty as states by default, 
exhibiting a weak and unconsolidated nature, without substantial statehood, cultural and 
political communion and marked by unusual levels of internal competition for resources and 
control of the state.115 But some of the constituent communities that exist have a very strong 
sense of belonging to their own group. The uncertain mix of international and domestic in the 
formation of sub-Saharan Africa renders it susceptible to human rights violations;116 it also 
misaligns the demarcation between internal and external, clouding the responsibilities of the 
individual, the community, the state and the international community. The internal 
differentiation between the ruling class and the people has ensured that the ruling class will 
support norms in the international sphere which will perpetuate them in government, while 
the people in their communal groupings resort to violence to achieve a measure of Lockean 
security.117 The rise of terrorism has also become entrenched in parts of sub-Saharan Africa 
such as Nigeria and Kenya as a means – albeit misguided – to reclaim community in the 
innate sense of the word. The Nigerian government is notably fighting insurgency in the 
South and the North at present. The non-state actors in both arenas of conflict question the 
legitimacy of the Nigerian state and their own enforced allegiance to the state. 
According to Kreijen,118 state attainment in sub-Saharan African was achieved by a 
‘legal trick’ which involved the abandonment of ‘effectiveness’. Therefore, according to this 
theory, sub-Saharan African states were recognized outside the classic method of state 
creation. This has led to inefficient statehood.119 The lack of effectiveness that Kreijen 
adduced to sub-Saharan states is exhibited by the fact that the central government’s authority 
is weak and doubtful; government is ineffectual and riddled with corruption; and there is 
segmentation of the community and society into various publics into which political 
allegiance is divided.120 Nevertheless, the international community recognises African states 
as legitimate and sovereign, on the basis of nothing else but recognition; the international 
community ensures territorial integrity, economic viability and democracy, therefore, the 
state exists.121  
Because the political culture in Africa is neo-patrimonial in nature; the government is 
seen as a source of personal enrichment and not national development; national development 
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remains the function of the community and is restricted to communal or ethno-linguistic 
development.122 Thus achieving democratization in sub-Saharan Africa, especially through 
regular elections, ignores the social and political nature of the constituent communities and 
the ideologies of the people of sub-Saharan Africa.123 Therefore state failure is endemic, 
inherent and systemic due to the nature of sub-Saharan Africa states, rather than specific 
events.124  
 
4.2.3. African Philosophies of Personhood and Community 
Sub-Saharan African ideals of community not only rely on the actual existence of 
community, but on a sense of community. An integral part of any community is the feeling of 
cohering.125 The lack of a sense of community in the international community will result in 
lack of political will and inertia, which is evident in reaction to crises in Rwanda, DRC, 
Darfur and the response to Ebola in 2014. The alternative would be to rely on self-interest for 
cohesion, thus, the international community’s sense of involvement in the Ebola crisis was 
not ignited until people outside sub-Saharan Africa became infected with the virus. 
Faced with these factors – peculiar personhood and imperfect statehood – Post-
Colonial sub-Saharan African states lack both the cohesion to achieve liberal democracy and 
the organisation and homogeneity of objectives to create free market economies. Thus the 
relationship of sub-Saharan Africa with an exclusive international community can be seen as 
an unconscious continuation of the mission civilisatrice, a persistently failed undertaking to 
make Africa more European.126 For example, in colonial Natal in South Africa, African 
marriage practices were proscribed in favour of European ones.127 Historically and 
contemporaneously, international narratives of actions in Africa have obscured the reality of 
European brutalism, support for oppressive regimes and the imposition of disadvantageous 
economic policies.128 The danger of alterity in the conception of the international community 
is the notional dehumanisation of populations, their ideologies, beliefs and practices.129 
Nevertheless, the current incarnation of the mission is believed to be shorn of racial 
overtones.130 With no outright divorce from the mission civilisatrice the ‘savages’ to be 
tamed will always regard the taming mechanism with suspicion. Cultural chauvinism, 
however, is not a counterpoint to cultural relativism. The term used depends on the amount of 
power and influence of the other; powerful states and collectives are said to be culturally 
chauvinistic, while less power attracts calls for relativism. Both concepts play into a false 
paradigm of history as a ‘linear, unidirectional progression’ from savage to civil.131  
Nevertheless, various ‘non-Western’ states such as China are increasing in influence 
on the international sphere, despite not being strictly democratic nor having free market 
economies. It has been suggested that the insistence on democracy and free market 
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economies is a way by which the previous influence of the US and Europe can be maintained, 
thus the influence of the UN varies depending on the region in question.132 
 
 
5. Defining the International Community through African Eyes 
 
The notion of the international community is predicated on individuals constituting states and 
states constituting the international community.133 Thus, as understood by Western society, 
communities are constituted from the bottom up making them more defensible,134 while sub-
Saharan African communities are said to be constituted top-down removing the question of 
defensibility, one monolith hardly needs protection from another monolith. These ontological 
differences have had no impact on the way in which democracy is prescribed, translated and 
transferred to sub-Saharan Africa. The understanding of personhood and community in sub-
Saharan African philosophy means that the rights-holder and primary constituent of society is 
the community. The rights of the individual are the rights of the community and the rights of 
the community are the rights of the individual.135 If one person starves, the community 
starves; if one person is a torturer, the community feels the shame. In liberal democratic 
jurisprudence, while some group rights are available, transferring all human rights to the 
community would be contrary to the individualistic intent of human rights. Two conflicting 
views of society arise here, the first is that the individual moulds society to their own needs 
and interests;136 while the African view is that society and its beliefs determine the nature of 
the individual; this relationship becomes, out of necessity, extremely cyclical. As understood, 
African understanding of community is incongruent with the international human rights law 
framework. Extrapolating an African approach to the international community allows for a 
more cohesive view of the international community. Furthermore, communal structures in 
Africa take on some of the duties of government without any legitimacy outside the artificial 
state boundaries; a large part of the attainment of ESC rights is community-driven.137 
Sovereign territorial control sometimes resides more in the communal structures than 
government.138 The example of Somalia and the non-recognition of Somaliland shows that 
external legitimacy and recognition carries more weight internationally than internal 
effectiveness.139  
The result of African understanding of community is that the operation of democracy 
will always fall short of the accepted norm; yet any modification of democracy and free 
market economy will be resisted by the international community.140 Counterintuitively, this 
permits abuse of liberal democracy by sub-Saharan African leaders, as the pure application of 
an African ideology of community in governance will strip them of their power, but an 
outward show of liberal democracy with establish their political influence. The international 
community is thus complicit in human rights abuses in sub-Saharan Africa resulting from 
institutional failure. Political participation in sub-Saharan Africa is linked to communality, 
this ensures the entrenchment of ethnic politics, even though liberal democracy wishes to 
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deemphasize the relevance of ethnicity in politics.141 As long as liberal democracy in sub-
Saharan Africa follows strict rules of regular elections, political parties and popular 
participation, it will remain ineffective and be unable to ensure governance that can protect 
human rights. Liberal democracy as generally accepted disregards the existence of strong 
ethnic divides that cross state boundaries, which are the norm in sub-Saharan Africa. The 
adoption of liberal democracy by sub-Saharan Africa to appease the ‘international 
community’ grants the government of sub-Saharan Africa access to the exclusive club, but 
denies the people of sub-Saharan Africa admission. Nevertheless, allowing African 
governments to adopt an ‘African’ style of government will most likely lead to an abuse of 
power, and so limits have to be placed on leaders’ powers externally; governments cannot 
pick and choose which limits they will accept. The problem with the articulation international 
human rights law is that the voices of ordinary people have been ignored. The international 
community claims to be speaking on their behalf, but they cannot speak what they have not 
heard. African governments claim to be speaking on behalf of their people, but it is in 
governments’ self-interest to misconstrue what their people are saying. The debate therefore, 
ignores the people that need it and become largely academic. 
Nevertheless, non-Western states and in particular African states have moved certain 
narratives forward, such as anti-colonialism, anti-apartheid/racialism and global equality.142 
These narratives, however, do not attract the same traction, attention or credence as purely 
Eurocentric concepts such as Westphalianism, civil and political rights, liberal democracy 
and free market economy. Liberal democracy protects individual autonomy;143 African 
traditional philosophy is focused on the preservation of its community and its customs.144 
Thus despite its best intentions, African observation of democracy is pervaded by the primacy 
of the community over the individual. This affects the inclusion of sub-Saharan African states 
in the international community. It skews observance of international law in favour of ESC 
rights over civil and political rights to the detriment of African populations.145 
The use of the word ‘community’ is meant to indicate shared values and identity 
founded on mutual rights, duties and obligations; a stronger sense of communality and 
commonality than ‘system’ or ‘society’.146 Despite the fact that African philosophy supports 
the type of communal nature that the international community aspires to, without academic 
intervention the nature of postcolonial African states will of necessity exclude them and their 
philosophies from the core formation of international community. 
The African understanding of community has some peculiar characteristics that could 
prove instructive to the constitution of the international community. However, this largely 
depends on which definition of international community is ascribed to the elusive entity. Any 
attempt to limit the international community on the basis of democracy (shared 
moral/political values) or free market economy (shared financial interests) will exclude sub-
Saharan African ideology and de-internationalise the international community. 
Theoretically, the African understanding of community helps in explaining how states 
can constitute international community and how international community can constitute 
states. Communal being cannot be divorced from communal actions. Western understanding 
of community is based on the fictional presumption of shared values and complete individual 
autonomy.147 These shared values rarely result in shared action unless shared interests are at 
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stake.148 This is exhibited in continuing multilateral military action in the Middle-East and 
inaction or delayed reaction to Ebola in West Africa. In African philosophy, responsibility is 
shared and reciprocal. Therefore, we are all equally responsible for each other’s’ welfare – 
the individual, the community and the state. These concepts are tangentially evident in UN-
supported concepts – human rights, Responsibility to Protect (R2P), human security – but the 
international system through the international community lacks the ideology to carry these 
visions. Conceptualising African ideology within international political thought can make the 
international community more effective. 
The nature of African states need to be directly addressed. Attempting to make them 
more viable by prescribing democracy ignores the facts on the ground. The direction of 
accountability in African states differs from that in a functioning democracy and is different 
from the notion of accountability in African philosophy.149 In functional democracies vertical 
accountability is based on the use of public resources and the ability of the government to 
make public policies that benefit the people, rather than, as is evident in contemporary 
African states, an exchange of personal benefit and favour.150 Conversely, African 
philosophies promote individual accountability to a monolithic community evincing a cyclic 
direction of accountability where both the government and the governed form part of a 
community and exist individually within society. This is the way in which the international 
community is meant to work. 
 
 
6. Possible Consequences of Continual Exclusion of Sub-Saharan African States 
 
Based on the foregoing, sub-Saharan Africa is faced with a few possibilities. It could either 
succumb to the pressures of disintegration and state failure that could lead to an implosion on 
a scale of which would have devastating and far-reaching effects. Intractable state failure in 
sub-Saharan Africa suggests the inevitable dissolution of some states.151 Or sub-Saharan 
Africa could forge its own identity or ‘sub-international community’ whose ideology has no 
traction within the mainstream understanding of international law. A third possibility of sub-
Saharan Africa Post-Colonial states living up to the idyll of ‘Westernisation’ or ‘civilisation’ 
by becoming textbook market economies or liberal democracies is unlikely, despite 
conservatism in international law prescribing this as the only option.152 Neither is the post-
colonial ideal of a reversion to precolonial groupings any more likely as those ties have been 
severed or diluted. Even if the aversion to the removal of colonial national boundaries can be 
overcome,153 precolonial sub-Saharan Africa no longer exists. The people of Africa are a 
complex hybrid of today and yesterday, the future and the past. This is notwithstanding the 
fact that colonial boundaries are largely incongruent and do not reflect the demarcation of 
ideologies that spill over boundaries. African internal conflicts thus have more in common 
with international armed conflicts, save for arbitrary lines on the ground that hold together 
perennially warring factions in false brotherhood. 
States in Africa have submitted themselves to various sub-regional mechanisms to 
uphold a sub-Saharan African model of community. This idea of communal reciprocity 
informed the inclusion of duties into to the African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights 
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(ACHPR).154 This was a way in which the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), and its 
spiritual successor the African Union (AU), wished to breathe life into the primacy of cultural 
community and family in African jurisprudence. Notwithstanding the good intentions behind 
the idea, the problem of the imperfect state – the primary duty-bearer – was unaddressed by 
the Charter and renders the duties-rights paradigm ineffectual. Also unaddressed is the 
incongruence of the duties in a system of international law that does not recognise the nature 
of African communities. This has caused the AU’s formulation of duties to either be 
criticised or dismissed.155 
Sub-Saharan African sub-regional mechanisms may serve as a source of customary 
‘regional’ international law or customary regional supranational law.156 International law 
allows for rules to exist which only a group of states are obligated to observe,157 especially in 
the case where they show their intention to be bound by way of signing a treaty or joining a 
sub-regional organisation with an agreed constitution, this would amount to binding custom. 
Regional custom becomes more relevant as the splinters in the fabric of the international 
community become more apparent. The argument that custom and shared values are the basis 
for international law and the foundation of the international community suggest that sub-
Saharan Africa may exist in an isolated African international community whose rules differ 
from that of the wider international community. Apart from the economic spheres of 
international law, most of international law is largely ineffective.158 At present, international 
authority and influence is waning because internationalism is not robust but mostly consists 
of rhetoric.159 The insistence on shared values takes no notice of international custom that is 
truly international, resulting in humanitarian intervention that is motivated by national self-
interest and is multi-lateral only and not international.  
One sees in sub-Saharan Africa the characteristics prescribed by Schimmelfennig for 
the evolution of the international community. There is a high level of economic interaction; 
ECOWAS, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC), among others are concerned with economic 
integration. Historically, there was a high-level of trade on the north-south axis of Africa as 
well as a lower level of trade along the east-west axis.160 This and the introduction of 
initiatives such as the ECOWAS passport – which allows unimpeded travel by all citizens of 
ECOWAS states through the sub-region161 – is evidence of high interaction density in the 
area. Furthermore, conflicts in the region tend to spill over borders. States need to contain 
conflict to ensure their security; due to the relative economic weakness of these states, this 
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security is easier in cooperation and by peaceful means. These factors provide a non-
humanitarian motive for humanitarian ends. All these features exemplify the shared values 
and interests of African states. Because the purpose of the community is to amalgamate 
varying individual interests for the benefit of the community,162 adopting the African 
approach to the creation of the international community is intuitively appropriate. African 
philosophy puts the community first and combines values and interests as the tool with which 
all the components of the community work for the advancement of community and therefore, 
each other. 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
There is an increasingly obvious realisation that states with inherently weak architecture are 
unable to exhibit the functions of a sovereign state. The UN has contemplated a situation 
where sovereignty and responsibility will revert to the international community when a state 
is unable to perform its sovereign duty. Since the international community is tenuous at best, 
this solution is tenuous, its premises are at variance with the rationale of equal sovereignty.163 
Thus any call for international and joint action suffers from the general lack of cohesion in 
the international system, and an inherent lack of legitimate authority. This is evident in the 
promotion of human rights, environmental protection and the fight against terrorism. 
While the international community is definitely more than the sum of its constituent 
parts,164 unanimity in the system which would solidify its status as a cohesive unit and grant 
it distinct legal personality and capacity to act, would only be achieved when and if values 
are actually shared and not imposed. Lack of cohesion, opens up the dominant actors to de-
legitimation of their actions and serves, in some cases, as a means to avoid action 
altogether.165 Issues that are of particular interest to sub-Saharan Africa are kept off the 
international agenda until they become important to the rest of the world. The 2014 Ebola 
crisis is a case in point. Conceptualising the international community should take into 
consideration a realistic picture of the global value system which is a combination of shared 
and disparate values as well as a good measure of antagonism.166 
The nature of the international system is such that international activity will crystallise 
in organisations such as the UN, however the dominance of actors will differ with the 
variance of several factors on the international scene: the nature and site of required action, 
military and economic might and national self-interest among others. It is suggested that a 
viable international community should be a ‘context-dependent, problem-driven 
configuration.’167 The usage of the term should be avoided without a relevant context, 
research should also take a holistic view of the international system that may or may not be 
evolving into the international community.168 The viability of this construction of 
international community will depend on the strictures that policy makers place on the 
formation of the international community and the flexibility of academic research in its 
willingness to explore alternative ways to articulate international life.  
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In determining the future and present role of African states, neither their precolonial 
ideologies nor postcolonial origins can be disregarded.169 Those origins form a vital 
illustration of interaction within the international system, without this evidence of interaction 
our vision of the international system is incomplete. More and accurate interdisciplinary 
research is needed and urged. Currently, most research is done from a Western perspective, 
thereby reinforcing Western ideas as shared values.170 Any suggestion against this approach 
is impaired by oppressive regimes who purport to be furthering the ends of ‘traditional 
African values.’ Nevertheless, the effectiveness of the international system and the possibility 
of the international community cannot be achieved without taking into account sub-Saharan 
Africa and its unique situation and perspectives. Narratives from Africa, such as the ideology 
of community, should be taken into account. Research should be collaborative across 
continents. African researchers should be proactive,171 and non-African researchers should 
not exclude African narratives.172 Researchers need to acknowledge that their objectivity can 
only be assured by the recognition of their subjectivity. 
The international community should strengthen its communal aspects, which consists 
of people and not states. States are not as valuable as people. Without communal (global 
populace) cohesion, the global community will not become international. International law, 
therefore, should have as its goal, absolute truth, absolute equality and absolute justice, 
regardless of ideological origins. 
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